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TRANSVALUING MEDIA STUDIES: 
OR, BEYOND THE MYTH OF THE MEDIATED CENTRE 
 
NICK COULDRY 
 
Media studies has become too close to, and too distant from, media, its object of 
analysis: too close, in that media studies readily reproduces one picture of what media 
are, that only makes sense if you stand close up to the highly centralised media forms 
we have until recently taken for granted; too distant, in that this myopia prevents 
media studies from grasping the broader landscape of how media do, and do not, 
figure in people’s lives. 
 
In this chapter, I will, first, diagnose several forms of this problem which each 
contribute to a phenomenon stretching well beyond media studies: the social 
construction I call ‘the myth of the mediated centre’ (cf Couldry, 2003). I will then 
describe how the landscape of media studies might look, if it were free of that myth, 
offering, if not a new paradigm for media studies, at least a new map of its 
possibilities for those tired of the old one.  
 
Some Background 
 
Until recently, the history of modern media has been the history of the emergence of 
centralised mass systems of mediation, sometimes, although not always, from more 
scattered beginnings. That history belongs to a wider story of the expansion of the 
nation-state and modern systems of government. Media studies, and equally the area 
of US communication studies focussed on media rather than on communication in the 
broader sense, emerged as disciplines whose primary object was mass media and their 
social consequences. Although in various ways, media studies has complicated earlier 
mass media models (most importantly through studying the diversity of audience 
interpretations), it is its original relation to centralised mass media that continues to 
shape its dominant interpretative frameworks and research priorities: textual analysis 
of media produced by large-scale media institutions, audience negotiations of those 
same media, the production cultures that lie behind those same media. While those 
areas of research are noble enough in themselves, they become an empirical problem 
when they block from view other regions of media production; this becomes a 
theoretical problem when it justifies that narrow focus by mythical claims about what 
is ‘really’ ‘central’ in contemporary societies; which, in turn, becomes a political 
problem when such theoretical bias blinds us to media’s contributions to social life 
(and politics) beyond, or indeed within, the centralising pressures of the nation-state. 
 
A research agenda focussed almost exclusively on the production, circulation and 
reception of mainstream media risks forfeiting media studies’ critical edge. Its 
underlying assumptions miss crucial dimensions of media change. It remains 
uncertain (and will be for a long time) whether expanding opportunities to make and 
circulate media beyond large-scale institutions (especially via the Internet), the steady 
globalization of media flows of all types (institutional and non-institutional), and the 
erosion of authority affecting the institutional clusters comprising the late modern 
nation-state, will, taken together, produce in time an experience of media that is 
radically less centralised than the one we take for granted; there are, after all, 
significant commercial forces attempting to close down precisely that possibility. But 
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there are sufficient centrifugal pressures in motion to require a vantage-point at some 
distance from what I call ‘the mediated centre’, if we want to grasp the wider 
landscape. 
 
By the mediated centre, I mean the social construction of centralised media (‘the 
media’ in common parlance) as our central access-point to the ‘central realities’ of the 
social world, whatever they are. Built into this construction, I will argue, are 
outmoded, indeed conservative, theoretical biases which no longer explain what we 
need to explain, and which we must move beyond.  
 
Removing the Roadblocks 
 
Elsewhere, I have analysed the myth of the mediated centre and its role in 
underpinning the media-oriented practices I call ‘media rituals’ (Couldry, 2003: 45-
48). This chapter considers the forms that myth takes when built into the theoretical 
frameworks of mainstream media studies. There are three such mythical forms: 
functionalism, centrism and spectacularism.  
 
Functionalism1  
 
Functionalism, at least in any explicitly developed form, has long since died out in 
sociology and anthropology. Its heyday was in the 1940s and 1950s in the work of the 
US sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951) and the British anthropologist A. Radcliffe-
Brown (1952); true, it has had a revival in Germany in the work of the sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann (1982), but neither Luhmann’s general theory of ‘autopoietic 
systems’ nor his late work on media (1999) has yet been influential in media studies, 
so it is safe to consider functionalism in its traditional guise without a detailed 
consideration of Luhmann’s more recent work. All the more striking then that, while 
the functionalist model is out-of-date, it lives on in media institutions’ discourses 
about themselves (where it fulfils a direct institutional purpose: self-justification) and 
in academic analyses of media. 
 
Functionalism is the idea (contentious, when stated directly) that large regions of 
human activity (‘societies’, ‘cultures’, and so on) can best be understood as if they 
were self-sufficient, complex, functioning systems. Depending on taste, the metaphor 
of functioning can be biological (the natural organism, such as the human body) or 
technological (the artificial system, such as the machine). Societies, or cultures, are 
conceived in functionalist accounts as complex ‘wholes’ formed of a series of ‘parts’, 
each of which ‘functions’ by contributing to the successful working of the ‘whole’. 
Action at the level of society’s or culture’s ‘parts’ has no unanticipated effects, and 
even if it does, it is quickly absorbed back into the ‘whole’’s wider functioning 
through positive feedback loops. 
 
There are many problems with functionalist attempts to model the multi-
dimensionality of social and cultural practice. Looking back from the beginning of the 
21st century, one obvious problem is the difficulty of conceiving any ‘society’ or 
‘culture’ as a self-sufficient system, given the huge range of forces operating across 
societal and cultural borders (see Urry, 2000, on ‘society’). This might suggest that 
the problems of functionalism are recent, derived from the globalizing pressures of 
late modernity; could functionalist models then still work, if applied cautiously and 
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locally? It is certainly true that national media remain an important reference-point in 
many, if not most, people’s media universes, whatever globalisation theorists say; 
why not then treat functionalism as a local truth? That would be a mistake, because 
the problems with functionalism are more fundamental and long-standing. The main 
problem lies with functionalism’s underlying claim that there are such totalities as 
‘societies’ and ‘culture’s which ‘function’ as working systems. This, perhaps, seems 
too abstract to contest outright (but for a powerful attack on the notion of ‘culture’, 
see Hannerz (1992)); the problems become clearer when this claim is applied in 
detail. We need go no further than Steven Lukes’ (1975) classic deconstruction of 
functionalist accounts of political ritual, which analyse political rituals in terms of 
how they contribute to society’s political ‘stability’ by affirming certain central 
beliefs and values. But even if there are such centrally held beliefs and values, which 
Lukes questions, this account begs deeper questions about ‘whether, to what extent, 
and in what ways society does hold together’ (Lukes, 1975: 297). Is there, in other 
words, a functioning social ‘whole’ of which political rituals could be a ‘part’? 
 
A superficial attraction of functionalist arguments is that they tie up all the loose ends 
– until you realise the price paid in the assumptions that drive functionalism in the 
first place. Elsewhere I have analysed Dayan and Katz’s influential (1992) account of 
‘media events’ as a functionalist model that revives the least convincing aspects of 
Emile Durkheim’s model of how societies hold together through collective 
representations (Couldry, 2003: chapter 4).2 Rather than repeat that argument, let us 
trace functionalist symptoms elsewhere in media studies. A clear attempt at 
revivalism is Jeffrey Alexander and Ronald Jacobs’ essay ‘Mass communication, 
ritual and civil society’ (Alexander and Jacobs, 1998). As they realise, the idea that 
media perform a positive social function can no longer simply mean arguing that 
media reproduce certain shared sets of beliefs or ideologies: how could such a simple 
model account for the enormous diversification of mediated publics? Instead, 
Alexander and Jacobs build, first, on Dayan and Katz’s claim for the central 
explanatory importance of ‘media events’: ‘the narrative elaboration of events and 
crises – understood as social dramas – is crucial for providing a sense of historical 
continuity in the crisis-bound, episodic constructions of universalistic solidarity that 
continually form and reform civil society’ (Alexander and Jacobs, 1998: 23). Note 
that the ‘whole’ here is ‘civil society’, which Alexander and Jacobs claim is 
continually ‘formed and reformed’ by media events, and so can contribute to the 
wider ‘whole’ of society (1998: 25). Media events ‘provide the cultural grounds for 
attachment to the social imaginary of society, and . . . plot points for updating the 
ongoing public narratives of civil society and nation’ (1998: 28). But on what is this 
huge feedback loop involving media, civil society and nation based?  
 
It is based on seeing media as providing society’s principal interpretative closures: 
 
‘[Media operate] as a cultural space where actors and events become typified into 
more general codes (eg sacred/ profane, pure/ impure/ democratic/ antidemocratic, 
citizen/ enemy) and more generic story forms which resonate with the society’s 
culture. Expressive media – such as novels or movies – are fictional symbolic 
forms that weave the binary codes of civil society into broad narratives and popular 
genres. . . . [as a result] the mass media . . . provides the cultural environment from 
which common identities and solidarities can be constructed.’ (Alexander and 
Jacobs 1998: 29-30) 
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This is a highly problematic account of media’s social role, but we must be clear 
about where exactly the problem lies. It does not lie in the claim that there are 
pressures towards ‘order’ and ‘closure’ in the contemporary social world to which 
media are major contributors; the whole point of analysing ‘media rituals’, for 
example, is to register such pressures. The problem lies in the assumption, first, that 
such pressures, when combined with everything else, produce a clear, unambiguous 
causal outcome and, second, that this outcome is a relatively stable social ‘order’. Put 
less abstractly, why believe (a) that civil society is based on certain ‘binary’ codes at 
all or (b) that those binary codes’ stability causes something we might call ‘social 
stability’? Why not social instability? Stability of what exactly? And, even if we could 
answer that, what could serve as evidence, for or against, Alexander and Jacobs’s 
thesis? All this remains unclear. 
 
There is, then, plenty of indeterminacy in functionalist accounts of the media. It is 
this, perhaps, that allows Michael Schudson, having convincingly argued against 
overplaying the ideological impacts of news (1995: 17), to endorse a socially 
integrationist role for media institutions, while simultaneously undercutting it: ‘[the 
media’s] capacity to publicly include is perhaps their most important feature. [The 
fact that we each read the same paper as elites] is empowering . . . the impression it 
promotes of equality and commonality, illusion though it is, sustains a hope of 
democratic life’ (1995: 25, added emphasis). This is a disarmingly honest, if 
inevitably therefore contradictory, statement of one of liberal democracy’s working 
assumptions. We find traces of it in later versions of Habermas’ public sphere thesis 
(Habermas, 1996) which conceives media as a complex network of spaces for public 
discussion and identification; the saving grace in Habermas’ case is that he intends his 
analysis normatively, not necessarily as the truth about how media work. It would be 
useful, however, to develop more complex ways for thinking about the media’s social 
consequences: for example, Liebes and Peri’s (1998) account of how in Israel there is 
both the multiplication of mass media melodramas and new public ‘sphericules’ of 
localised community media. The totalising tendency of functionalist explanations may 
miss the point entirely. 
 
Yet functionalist explanations continue to crop up in surprising places. The standard 
positions in debates about stardom and celebrity culture assume, at root, that the 
industrial production of celebrity discourse ‘must’ contribute to some wider social 
‘function’, whether we call it identity-formation or social integration or both. The 
classic functionalist account of stars is Alberoni (1972), but there are clear traces of 
such thinking in more recent accounts: Dyer (1986: 17), Reeves (1988), Lumby 
(1999), Turner et al (2000).3 Such approaches can also live with functionalism’s 
indeterminacy, if in postmodern guise: ‘contradictory and tainted with inauthenticity 
as they may be, it seems clear that celebrities perform a significant social function for 
media consumers’ (Turner et al. 2000: 13). McKenzie Wark is even bolder: ‘we may 
not like the same celebrities, we may not like any of them at all, but it is the existence 
of a population of celebrities, about whom to disagree, that makes it possible to 
constitute a sense of belonging’ (Wark, 1999: 33, my emphasis, quoted Turner et al., 
2000: 14).  
 
The problem with such functionalism, whatever its ‘postmodern’ guise, is that it 
closes down massively our options for explaining what is actually going on, and in a 
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way that fits far too neatly with the social ‘functions’ relevant media institutions (film 
distributors, celebrity magazines, PR firms) might like to ascribe to themselves. 
Where is the evidence that people ‘identify’ with celebrities in any simple way, or 
even that they regard ‘celebrity culture’ as important, rather than a temporary 
distraction? The absence of empirical work in this area illustrates how functionalism 
can block off the routes to open-minded research. 
 
There are still more places where we might find functionalism lurking in media 
studies,4 but instead I want to turn to two other frameworks that shore up an automatic 
sense of the media as social centre.  
 
Centrism 
 
If functionalism, at least in its original form, is quite a distinct framework for 
interpreting the media, ‘centrism’ is more diffuse. I mean by this term the tendency in 
media studies (whether in accounts of media production, distribution or consumption) 
to assume that it is the largest media institutions and our relationships to them, that are 
the overwhelming research priority, so that any media outside that institutional space 
are of marginal importance. Centrism closes down the field of media we analyse and 
(in so doing) reinforces its own validity in an endless self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Centrism is distinct from functionalism, since it need involve no assumption that 
society (as opposed to media) has a ‘centre’. It is worth also distinguishing ‘centrism’ 
from another problematic idea , usually called mediacentrism: the automatic 
assumption that media are central to explaining the dynamics of contemporary 
societies. The latter is a difficulty inherent to all media analysis, that needs separate 
discussion (see below). 
 
Centrism is so entrenched in the media studies landscape that it may seem impolite to 
name it as such. It takes many forms. First, it underlies a bias towards nationally 
distributed media and against locally distributed media. As an example, consider that, 
even in a country as large as the USA, it took until 1991 for an authoritative study of 
local media (that is non-national media, including media focussed on catchment areas 
as large as Chicago) to be written (Kaniss, 1991). Local media remains a little studied 
area, even though for many people it is local versions of media (especially of the 
press) that they consume. Second, we can detect centrism at work, among other 
things, in media studies’ concentration on media assumed to have the largest (that is, 
the most centrally focussed) audiences: television and film, as opposed to the press 
and radio. There are off-setting factors here, of course, such as the greater ease of 
creating and accessing archives of press versus television and radio. But the 
underlying presumption, when deciding research priorities, in favour of audience size 
remains significant, even though it cuts across a factor that should be equally, if not 
more, important: the significance which particular media outputs actually play in 
people’s everyday practice (which may be greater, after all, for local media or highly 
specialised ‘cult’ media than for mass distributed media).  
 
This leads to a third point: the relative inattention to media made and received outside 
the dominant systems of circulation despite the important work already done on 
‘alternative media’ (Downing, 1984, 2001; Rodriguez, 2001; Atton, 2001, but note 
there is a large, if scattered, research tradition beyond these prominent books). A 
resurgence of interest in ‘alternative media’ may now be under way in the context of 
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new, increasingly globalised, social activism. This only sharpens the paradox of why 
alternative media are not given greater prominence in media research agendas 
(Couldry, 2002).  
 
Inattention to alternative media is properly called centrist, rather than functionalist. 
An influential example is Nicholas Garnham’s work. Garnham (2000: 68) has mocked 
the ‘productivist romanticism’ of visions of a less centralised system of media 
production such as Brecht’s (1972) famous vision of an open space of radio producer/ 
consumers; this position is rooted in a long-standing conviction that alternative media 
is of minimal political relevance (Garnham, 1990). This marginalisation is inadequate 
to a world where alternative media production, such as the Independent Media Centre 
movement, is integral to activism (the protests against the Seattle World Trade 
Organisation meetings in 1999) that has influenced mainstream policy debates, and 
where the anti-centrist media strategy of organisations such as the Zapatistas has 
influenced mainstream news agendas. The global momentum of research into 
alternative media can no longer be ignored, if we are interested in a comparative 
understanding of media’s potential contribution to social change (Couldry and Curran, 
2003).  
 
Spectacularism 
 
It is worth noting briefly a recent variant on functionalism and centrism, that also 
blocks our view of the contemporary media landscape: spectacularism. By this I mean 
the tendency, whether celebratory or critical, to treat the spectacular aspects of recent 
mainstream media as if they were permanent features of how mediated societies will 
from now on be organised.  
 
Spectacularism too has a postmodernist version of which is anti-functionalist, since it 
is highly sceptical of any social ‘centre’ or ‘essence’ waiting to be ‘expressed’ 
through media spectacle. Yet such work offers a surprisingly romantic (not to say, 
implicitly centrist) account of the social solidarity apparently produced by media 
spectacle. Here is Nestor Garcia Canclini in a generally insightful argument 
identifying as one aspect of ‘the new sociocultural scene’: 
 
‘ . . . [t]he shift from the citizen as a representative of public opinion to the 
consumer interested in enjoying quality of life. One indication of this change is 
that argumentative and critical forms of participation cede their place to the 
pleasure taken in electronic media spectacles where narration or the simple 
accumulation of anecdotes prevails over reasoned solutions to problems.’ (Garcia 
Canclini, 2001: 24) 
 
Or here, less cautiously (and much closer to functionalism) is Michel Maffesoli: 
‘television permits participants to “vibrate” together. One cries, laughs, or stamps 
one’s feet in unison, and this, without actually being in the presence of each other, a 
kind of communion is created whose social effects are still to be measured’ 
(Maffesoli, 1996: 57). As Maffesoli disarmingly notes, such effects are still to be 
measured! There is no unproblematic evidence for the changes Garcia Canclini and 
Maffesoli detect, and yet their intuition of a fundamental shift in media practice and 
consumption is here already reified into an upbeat rereading of Baudrillard’s earlier 
pessimism about the age of ‘simulation’. 
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There is no such romanticism in Douglas Kellner’s important recent deconstruction of 
‘media spectacle’ (Kellner 2003). There is a danger, even in Kellner’s laudably 
critical account, of reproducing precisely the assumptions about the centralising 
power of media spectacle from which he wants to get critical distance. Thus Kellner 
writes that ‘the celebrities of media culture are the icons of the present age, the deities 
of an entertainment society, in which money, looks, fame and success are the ideals 
and goals of the dreaming billions who inhabit Planet Earth’ (2003: viii) and, later on, 
that ‘media spectacles are those phenomena of media culture that embody 
contemporary society’s basic values’ (2003: 2) as media play ‘an ever-escalating role 
in everyday life’ (2003: 2) with ‘media culture . . . the stage on which social conflicts 
unfold and social reality is constructed’ (2003: 89, added emphasis). Clearly Kellner 
does not endorse centrism or spectacularism as values – quite the opposite. My point, 
however, is that entangled with the apparently innocent notion of ‘spectacle’ is a 
theoretical framework that is basically structural-functionalist (cf Shils, 1975). If we 
use terms such as ‘spectacle’ in media sociology, it must be with caution, and with the 
empirical safety valve of asking: what in fact do people think about media spectacle? 
Is there as much disbelief as belief? If so, in what sense are they reproductions of 
‘shared values’? How ‘central’, and for whom, is the mediated ‘centre’ that 
contemporary media spectacle tries to project? It is just such questions that 
functionalism, centrism, and approaches derived from them, close off.  
 
The View is Clearing . . .   
 
Fortunately there are theoretical developments under way, which encourage a move in 
this direction. 1960s and 1970s attacks on functionalism have been reinforced by 
post-structuralist arguments: for example, Foucault’s (1980) attack on the idea that 
power operates through its concentration, like a substance, at particular central sites, 
rather than through the structured flow of practices across the whole of social space; 
Laclau’s (1990) attack on ‘society’ as an impossible totality. More recently, the 
concept of ‘society’ as a container of social action has been dismantled within 
sociology, particular in work on globalisation. Crucial here has been Ulrich Beck’s 
argument for a ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ that analyses the social world from 
beyond the confines of the nation-state, without however reducing the local and 
national to insignificance (Beck, 2000; cf Urry, 2000). These theoretical shifts do not 
resolve all the issues; there is, perhaps, an implicit media-centrism in Urry’s account 
of a ‘sociology beyond societies’ which ascribes automatic and drastic effects to 
global media flows, without enough evidence of how they take effect, on whom, and 
under what conditions. These difficulties aside, a crucial step is made when Beck 
challenges the social sciences’ ‘secret Hegelianism’ (2000: 80) ‘which sees society as 
derived from the state’s claim to embody the principle of order’. We need an 
equivalent distance from media studies’ ‘Hegelianism’ that installs national media 
concentrations as the only reference-point for explaining the media’s social 
consequences. It is in this spirit that I want, shortly, to turn to a wider space of 
possibilities – theoretical, empirical and political – for understanding media.   
 
Transvaluation? 
 
First, however, I must justify this chapter’s title. You might still baulk at its claim of 
transvaluing media studies. What exactly is involved in ‘transvaluation’? 
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The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche claimed to have ‘transvalued’ conventional 
morality by reducing it to prejudices that were anything but moral: morality, he 
argued, is based not in the grand ‘values’ of fairness or justice, but in ‘rancour’ 
(Nietzsche, 1956 [1847]: 170). Nietzsche extended his attack to science and truth, 
arguing that beneath the ‘will to truth’ lay an ‘impetuous demand for certainty’, 
indeed the ‘physiological demands for the preservation of a certain species of life’ 
(Nietzsche, 1974 [1887]: 288; 1973 [1886]: 35). For Nietzsche ‘transvaluation’ means 
reducing a framework of thought to forces directly at odds with its self-image and 
professed ‘values’; through transvaluation, we can stand outside that framework and 
grasp a wider field of possibility (1974 [1887]: 280). We don’t have to agree with 
each one of Nietzsche’s transvaluations to see the general value of this approach. It 
has had a lasting influence through Michel Foucault’s adoption of Nietzsche’s 
genealogical method (Foucault, 1977): Foucault’s analysis of discourse not ‘as groups 
of signs . . . but as practices which systematically form the objects of which they 
speak’ (1972: 49) is an extended application of the principle of transvaluation. 
 
I am not claiming, of course, to have offered anything so grand as a ‘genealogy’ of 
media studies: that would require a much longer historical argument. But, in offering 
a perspective beyond media studies’ excessive focus on the centralised systems of 
media production that were originally its object, I want to signal the more open field 
of research that results when we distance ourselves from that love of the ‘mediated 
centre’. ‘Transvaluation’ is a useful metaphor for this shift.5  
 
Wittgenstein offers an alternative metaphor. In the course of unpicking the illusions 
into which language traps philosophy, Wittgenstein argues that it is the ‘preconceived 
idea of the crystalline purity’ of language that philosophy must transcend. What 
matters here is not (fortunately!) that enormous issue, but the way Wittgenstein argues 
we should proceed. The problem with the idea of language’s transparency, he argues, 
is that it is merely the effect of how we use language when trying to explain its 
workings, not the explanation of those workings: ‘we predicate of the thing what lies 
in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we 
think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality’ (Wittgenstein, 1978 
[1953]: 46). The situation is similar with the conventional framework of media 
studies. Because, having been formed within a highly centralised system of media 
production, we can make sense of media as necessarily centralised, we do make sense 
of media that way, ignoring everything beyond our usual focus. Instead we need, as 
Wittgenstein says, to ‘turn[] our whole examination around’ and to see the hidden 
connections between those old assumptions and the form of social organisation that 
gave rise to them - in the past, but not necessarily in the future.  
 
This makes clear that, as well as avoiding functionalism, centrism and their recent 
variant, spectacularism, we must also avoid media-centrism, that is, giving undue 
prominence to media rather than other causal factors in explaining social phenomena 
(cf Martin-Barbero, 1993). If we want to understand what media do in the world, we 
must look beyond the standard lines of explanation that media discourses (above all, 
the myth of the mediated centre) encourage us to adopt. 
 
A New Map of Media Studies 
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How might the landscape of media studies (both its recent past and its future research 
priorities) look if we jettisoned the myth of the mediated centre and explored more 
openly how media are produced, circulated, received and (quite possibly) ignored in 
the contemporary social world?  
 
To orientate ourselves, let’s be clear where we start from. First, empirical research 
must start out from a question, not an assumption, regarding the existence of anything 
like a mediated centre. We need to know much more about the relative importance in 
people’s lives of (1) mainstream media institutions, (2) other media  productions, and 
(3) non-media influences, and to understand better the range of variation here among 
individuals and sociological types. Second, as the range of media themselves 
increases, and the complexity of their potential interactions increases exponentially, 
our research can take for granted a mediated environment (in certain parts of the 
world at least: I come back to issues of comparative research later) that is super-
saturated. While important factors close down individuals’ choice of media (so 
generating ‘ideal types’ of media consumer remains possible), the range of paths that 
individuals might choose across the media environment is huge, including a path 
along which media have minimal direct significance. Third, while it is beyond doubt 
that the flow of media has increased absolutely, this may not be an even distribution 
and the task is to understand how media density differs between my living space and 
yours, this work environment, or leisure context, and that one.  
 
Along these three axes – engagement, selection, spatial distribution – we need to 
know more, much more, about the variation between individuals’ and groups’ 
orientations to media. If we trace out a map of the resulting landscape of media 
research (present and future), it has two crucial landmarks (knowledge, agency) 
which, assuming media still wants a critical edge, imply a third (ethics). 
 
Knowledge 
 
By knowledge, I mean, not our knowledge of media as researchers, but the 
relationship between media and the social distribution of knowledge about the world. 
The primary question, then, is not the analysis of this or that media form, but the role, 
if any (and there could be huge variation here), of different media in people’s 
acquisition and use of knowledge, including knowledge of the social world. 
 
This is an area where much important empirical work has been done in recent years: 
for example, the Glasgow Media Group’s work on media influence on audience 
understandings of public issues (see Kitzinger, 1999 for useful summary), work on 
media and the economy (Gavin, 1999), and on media’s relation to public opinion 
generally (Lewis, 2001).6 My point here is not to condense a literature review into a 
few lines, but to emphasise that public knowledge is surely the issue by which media 
research should orient itself (cf Corner, 1995); if we cannot say anything about 
media’s possible contribution to the distribution of knowledge of the world in which 
we act, then something fundamental is missing (cf Kitzinger, 1999: 17).  
 
Yet it is clear there are a number of issues on which further research is needed: first, 
about the uses towards which media-sourced knowledge is put (or indeed not put) by 
individuals and groups across a range of real-life contexts; second, about the status of 
media relative to other potential sources of knowledge or authoritative information, 
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both when information is originally acquired and when it is later put back into 
circulation (in argument, in self-presentation, and so on). Third, developing from the 
second, we need to know much more about the less explicit, more embedded and 
naturalised, use of mediated ‘knowledge’ in everyday interaction and thought, again 
across of a range of contexts (including those of media production, which is where the 
causal loop turns back onto itself). There is value here, I suggest, in rethinking 
Durkheim’s notion of the social ‘category’ to grasp the more systematic dimensions 
of the media’s contribution to how the social world is constructed (cf Couldry, 
forthcoming, b). Whether Durkheim or perhaps other models help us most is of course 
a matter for debate, a debate needed within media studies and with sociology more 
generally. For if most media sociologist’s gut instincts are right – and media play a 
significant role in influencing the circulation of knowledge – then media studies has 
much to contribute to a renewed sociology of knowledge. This, however, requires 
media studies to be more open to the social sciences in general (cf Tulloch, 2000: 19-
32). 
 
Agency 
 
If one key focus of media research is knowledge (what do media contribute to the 
knowledge agents have of the world in which they act?), another is agency itself. 
Nicholas Garnham has expressed this perhaps better than anyone, in his critical 
discussion of audience research: ‘the point is not whether the audience is active or 
passive, but rather the fields of action which are opened up or closed down’ (1999: 
118).7 Accumulating evidence about how people read or engage with this or that text 
is not, by itself, enough unless it contributes to our understanding of how they act in 
the social and personal world, with or without reference to media.  
 
Having said this, agency must be researched at many levels, which I can only begin to 
sketch here. We need more research on how (under what conditions and with what 
result) do people exercise their agency in relation to media flows. There is the basic, 
but vital, question of how people select from what is potentially on offer or (more 
drastically) screen out media that are imposed upon them (in public or working 
spaces, or within the constraints of their home). There is the question also of how 
people allocate their attention and emotional investments among the media they 
happen to consume; there is a great difference between media that merely passes 
before us and media with which we sense a strong connection (whether public or 
private). Fan studies has done much to explore this difference,8 but the difference 
arises in contexts other than fandom. Such questions only become more difficult as 
the media environment itself becomes more complex and multilayered (see Everett, 
2003 on the meanings of online ‘interactivity’). We need also to understand better 
how media contribute to people’s agency across various institutional spheres outside 
media. Every sphere of life requires separate study (for example, consumption, 
personal relations, health, education, work, politics). While some work exists on the 
connections between media and these non-media spheres, it is around people’s 
orientations, specifically, to media institutions that a significant literature has grown 
in the 1990s,  as researchers have become curious about how people think, or in some 
cases find it difficult to think, about their own media consumption (Press, 1991; 
Lembo, 2000; Seiter, 1999; Schroder, 2000; Hoover, 2003; BFI/OU 2003).  
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Related to agency is the more general question of how media connect to belief: 
people’s belief about, or trust in, the authority of institutions  (state, school, religious 
institutions). Indeed, once we drop the centralist framework criticised earlier in the 
chapter, the question of people’s beliefs about, or even orientation towards, media 
institutions becomes particularly interesting (Couldry, 2000); what, for example, of 
those who have only a minimal orientation to media? This, in turn, raises the question 
of how far different media territories, operating under specific historical trajectories, 
are characterised by different patterns of media belief (see, for example, Rajagopal’s 
interesting (2001) account of the new significance of centralised media in nationalist 
Hindu politics in India).  
 
Finally, there is the difficult question of how media might diminish people’s sense of 
agency. The assumption has usually been that media are at worst neutral in this regard 
and at best add to people’s possibilities for agency (for example, Scannell, 96). This, 
however, ignores another possibility, which is that the structured asymmetry of media 
communication works to limit at least some people’s sense of agency, just as happens 
in the structured asymmetry of work and class relations (Couldry, 2000: 22, cf Sennett 
and Cobb, 1972). This is one reason (but strong arguments can also be made in 
relation to knowledge and ethics) why alternative media must be studied: because 
their less asymmetrical patterns of production may generate alternative forms of 
agency and civic practice (Rodriguez, 2001).  
 
In these, and no doubt many other, ways, the study of media should aim to contribute 
to our broader understanding of agency in the contemporary world and, in so doing, 
connect with important debates in the social sciences (Touraine, 1988; Dubet, 1994).  
 
Ethics 
 
Knowledge and agency each raise ethical and political implications, but if media 
studies is to remain a critical, not purely administrative, tradition of research, it must 
consider what explicit ethical stance it should adopt to media.  
 
Such discussion has normally been limited to the importance of media studies taking a 
stance on questions of power. Much less debated and much more contentious are 
explicit questions of media ethics. These come into view, once we abandon the 
assumption that today’s centralised system of media production and distribution is the 
only possibility; what are the ethical implications of the media we currently have? 
Aspects of such a debate have, of course, been under way for some time, for example 
in relation to Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, but that debate is largely about 
media’s contribution to political deliberation. This is not the only, or even the most, 
important dimension of media ethics. 
 
The subject of ethics is the type of life it is good to lead, so an ethics of media, at its 
simplest, would concern the contribution of media production/ consumption, under 
prevailing conditions, to the good life of each person. Difficult ethical questions arise 
about the extent to which in societies saturated by media a good life should be a 
public, that is, to some degree mediated, one; difficult moral questions arise about the 
grounds on which it is right to impose media publicity on another without their full 
consent (cf O'Neill, 1990). Even more difficult ethical and moral questions arise about 
the long-term consequences of how media tend to cover public matters, such as war or 
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human disasters (Robins, 1995; Boltanski, 1999). What has been lacking so far, 
however, is any theoretical framework for debating such issues. From philosophy, 
Derrida and Stiegler (1996) have pointed in the direction of an ethics of audiovisual 
literacy, while Hubert Dreyfus (2001) has started debate on the ethical consequences 
of the Internet as a form of social interaction; from the direction of media studies, 
three recent books have begun to explore the implications of philosophical debates, 
past and present, for thinking about media and power (Garnham, 1999; Peters, 1999; 
Silverstone, 1999). But, as yet, there has been no systematic engagement between the 
relevant branches of philosophy (ethics, political theory) and media sociology. This 
debate is much needed, and requires a cosmopolitan perspective that takes seriously 
the role of media discourses in constructing the (often merely national) contexts for 
particular types of politics and their hidden exclusions (Isin, 2002). 
 
It can only happen, I suggest, by building, from the side of media studies, on the 
questions of knowledge and agency discussed already. Here, in debates around 
narrative, agency and ethics (Ricoeur, 1992), textual analysis of media has much to 
contribute: not for its own sake, but as part of an examination of how media narratives 
do, and should, help us imagine our place in the world.  
 
Concluding Note 
 
It might seem strange to mention textual analysis only at the end of tracing a new map 
of media research; even stranger not to have mentioned political economy at all. But 
this is deliberate. 
 
When media studies stood too close to a particular, centralised system of media 
production, distribution, and consumption, the primary questions were, quite 
plausibly: what economics drive that system, how can we analyse its outputs and 
people’s specific interpretations of them? But without that assumed central focus, the 
research questions for social science inquiry into media (literary-style analysis is 
another matter) are necessarily decentered, and more complex: how and on what 
terms do certain media, rather than others, contribute to the knowledge and agency of 
individuals and groups in a particular social environment? And (from an explicitly 
ethical perspective) how, if at all, should and could things be otherwise? Political 
economy and textual analysis, those two dominant traditions of earlier media studies, 
still play a vital role, of course, in helping us answer those larger questions, but they 
are not our required starting-points.  
 
Admittedly, the map I have sketched invites media studies researchers to travel much 
more widely than in the past across the terrain of historical and social science inquiry. 
The opportunity, however, for media studies by so doing to establish itself more 
securely within that wider terrain will, I hope, make the journey worthwhile.   
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1
 For a more detailed discussion of functionalist accounts of ‘ritual’ in media studies, see Couldry 
(forthcoming, a). 
2
 As I make clear in Couldry (2003), there are other non-functionalist ways of applying Durkheim. 
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3
 A theoretically more complex approach is Marshall (1999), but even here note the unguarded 
comment at the beginning of the book: ‘Celebrity status operates at the very center of the culture as it 
resonates with conceptions of individuality that are the ideological growth of Western culture’ (1999: 
x, added emphasis). What centre? 
4
 See for example my earlier discussion of Paddy Scannell’s work (Couldry 2000: 10-12). 
5
 Note however that I intend the term in a different sense from some recent interpreters of Nietzsche  
who argue that his transvaluation of values removes the possibility of, or need for, critical perspective 
on society’s myths (Vattimo, 1992: 24-25: chapters 1-3; cf Maffesoli, 1996: 19). On the contrary, such 
relativising accounts of contemporary mediascapes are part of what I want to move beyond (see 
‘Spectacularism’ above). I cannot, however, avoid the ambiguities built into Nietzsche’s metaphors, 
indeed his whole philosophical style. 
6
 Cf the essays in Gripsrud (1999). 
7
 Larry Grossberg had, from a different perspective, already made a similar point: ‘we need . . . not a 
theory of audiences, but a theory of the organization and possibilities of agency at specific sites in 
everyday life’ (1997: 341).  
8
 See Barker and Brooks (1997), Harrington and Bielby (1995) for very open-minded empirical 
accounts. 
